Balthazar
Luonnollisesti.
Mr Natural sanoi:En tiedä mitä Potsdamin julistuksessa oli japanilaisille niin vaikeaa sulattaa.
Sen verran korjaan tätä, että keisarin asemaa tai pikemminkin sen säilyttämistä koskevan kohdan poisjättäminen julistuksesta oli japanilaisille mitä ilmeisimmin se kynnyskysymys. Tässä yhteenveto tämän aikajanan tapahtumista.July 13
Washington intercepts and decodes a cable from Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to his Ambassador in Moscow that states, "Unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace.."
Monet sopimusta sorvaamassa olleet amerikkalaisvaikuttajat olisivat halunneet lisätä Potsdamin julistukseen keisarin aseman säilyttämistä puoltavan kohdan,
May 28
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy argues to Secretary of War Stimson that the term "unconditional surrender" should be dropped: "Unconditional surrender is a phrase which means loss of face and I wonder whether we cannot accomplish everything we want to accomplish in regard to Japan without the use of that term."
...
In a State Department Memorandum of Conversation, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew describes a meeting with President Truman that day. Grew writes: "The greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese is their belief that this would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution of the Throne. If some indication can now be given the Japanese that they themselves, when once thoroughly defeated and rendered impotent to wage war in the future will be permitted to determine their own future political structure, they will be afforded a method of saving face without which surrender will be highly unlikely."
mutta Truman amerikkalaisten enemmistön oikeustajua tulkiten tai jostain muusta syystä kieltäytyi siitä.June 9
Chief of Staff General George Marshall , in a memo to Secretary of War Stimson, writes, "We should cease talking about unconditional surrender of Japan and begin to define our true objective in terms of defeat and disarmament."
Japanilaiset olivat lisäksi hyvin todennäköisesti hakeneet aktiivisesti, jos eivät antautumista, niin ainakin rauhanneuvotteluja jo pitkin kevättä ja kesää.July 23 and 24
McCloy writes in diary in Potsdam, "Throughout it all the 'big bomb' is playing its part - it has stiffened both the Prime Minister and the President. After getting Groves' report they went to the next meeting like little boys with a big red apple secreted on their persons."
May 12
William Donovan , Director of the Office of Strategic Services, reports to President Truman that Japan's minister to Switzerland, Shunichi Kase, wished "to help arrange for a cessation of hostilities."
July 13
Secretary of Navy Forrestal writes in his secret diary: "The first real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war came today through intercepted messages from Togo, Foreign Minister, to Sato, Jap Ambassador in Moscow, instructing the latter to see Molotov if possible before his departure for the Big Three meeting and if not then immediately afterward to lay before him the Emperor's strong desire to secure a a termination of the war."
July 18
President Truman writes in his diary, "P.M. [Churchill] & I ate alone. Discussed Manhattan (it is a success). Decided to tell Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M. of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe the Japs will fold up before Russia comes in. I am sure they will when Manhattan [reference to Manhattan Project] appears over their homeland. I shall inform about it at an opportune time."
Truman, tai liittoutuneet, eivät kuitenkaan japanilaisten neuvottelutarjouksiin tarttuneet. Amerikkalaiset halusivat päättää sodan ennen puna-armeijan tuloa ja heillä oli myös sisäpoliittisia paineita käyttää kallista ydinasetta.August 3
President Truman aboard Augusta receives new report that Japan is seeking peace. Walter Brown , special assistant to Secretary of State Byrnes, writes in his diary, "Aboard Augusta - President, Leahy , JFB agreed Japs looking for peace. (Leahy had another report from Pacific.) President afraid they will sue for peace through Russia instead of some country like Sweden."
March 3
Head of the War Mobilization Board and future Secretary of State James Byrnes sends a memo to Franklin Roosevelt warning that if there is no "product" before the end of the war "there would be serious consequences for the Democratic Party."
Euroopan liittoutuneiden joukkojen ylipäällikkö Eisenhower kyseenalaisti atomipommien käytön jo nujerrettua Japania vastaan.May 28
Leo Szilard , along with Walter Bartky and Harold Urey , meet with Jimmy Byrnes at his home in Spartanburg, South Carolina. Szilard attempts to persuade Byrnes to demonstrate the bomb's power rather than using it on Japan. Byrnes asks Szilard, "How would you get Congress to appropriate money for atomic energy research if you do not show results for the money which has been spent already?" Reflecting on this meeting later, Szilard writes, "I thought to myself how much better off the world might be had I been born in America and become influential in American politics, and had Byrnes been born in Hungary and studied physics. In all probability there would then have been no atomic bomb and no danger of an arms race between America and Russia."
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